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In much of the literature about the Internet and digital communications, there is the 
presumption that a natural association exists between the Internet and democracy. 
The Internet is assumed to be an empowering institution because of the American 
idealism and altruism of its “founding fathers”; the computer programmers who 
linked their technical objective of facilitating access to endless streams of 
information and people to broader politics of liberation.1 Liberation and a 
democratic philosophy are assumed to be inherent in Internet design because of its 
freedom from centralized management and control. The sentiment is well summed- 
up in the oft-quoted observation of John Gilmore, a founder of the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF), that “the Net interprets censorship as damage and routes 
around it.”2
There are probably as many debates about “freedom” and the meaning of “free 
access” in relation to the Internet as there are about the nature of “democracy” itself. 
However, the two share a discourse on the importance of a robust civil society and 
presumptions about freedom of communication. What the Internet empowers can be 
described as democratic in the sense suggested by Sheldon Wolin:
In my understanding, democracy is a project concerned with the political 
potentialities of ordinary citizens, that is, with their possibilities for 
becoming political beings through the self-discovery of common concerns 
and of modes of action for realising them.3
By access to the Internet and its information flows, new possibilities arise. New 
forms of identity, self-discovery, collective discussion, and engagement become 
possible; the communications medium facilitates exchanges of ideas and information 
that influence all other areas of life. To the extent that Internet transactions are 
unmediated and uncensored, the hope is that all kinds of social relations -  global, 
local, and personal -  are suitably engaged and invigorated. Whilst all these relations 
may not be ordinarily characterized as political in nature, there are political elements
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in the constitution of all interactions that allow people to come together and pursue 
common desires.
But if we move beyond the rhetoric of the Internet’s potential for 
empowerment, is it possible to analyze the Internet itself in terms of its democratic 
credentials? More specifically, what are the sites of activity where others determine 
the potentialities, political and otherwise, of ordinary citizens?
If the volume of pages in books and law journals is any guide, intellectual 
property law (IP), and copyright in particular, is the major site for governance of 
citizens and the Internet.4 The push for stronger IP laws emerged in the mid-to-late 
1990s. Intellectual property became the focus of law and globalization debates, and 
a site of major revision. The much heralded Internet freedoms, which facilitated fast 
connections and easy transfer of digital information at low cost, were targeted as a 
significant economic and cultural problem. The sentiment is well-reflected in the 
claim by Time Warner CEO Richard Parsons that peer-to-peer technology:
[i]sn’t just about a bunch of kids stealing music. It’s about an assault on 
everything that constitutes the cultural expression of our society. If we 
fail to protect and preserve our intellectual property system, the culture 
will atrophy. And corporations won’t be the only ones hurt. Artists will 
have no incentive to create. Worst case scenario: The country will end up 
in a sort of cultural Dark Ages.5
Another common claim was that digital technology led to “convergence” of media 
and markets. The global information economy thus required “harmonization” of 
copyright laws. The implication was that simplified, generalized minimum standards 
would lead to “one size fits all” copyright across the globe. Substantial reform was 
effected by five levels of law-making.
Firstly, new international agreements were enacted such as the 1994 World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Related Aspects o f Intellectual Property 
Agreement (TRIPS) and the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization 
Copyright Treaty (WCT)6. Previously, copyright had not been considered part of the 
WTO’s remit. These agreements created new international obligations and minimum 
standards for protection of owner rights globally. Secondly, at national level, many 
countries, including the USA, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, enacted
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new digital copyright laws. These laws generally restricted users’ rights to take 
advantage of the Internet’s potential to freely access and exchange material online. 
Thirdly, owners developed more advanced technological means of tracking and 
restricting use of digital material to facilitate broader enforcement of their newly won 
rights. Fourthly, strategic litigation highlighted the areas that may require future 
legislative attention and served to discourage investment in, and deployment of, 
sharing technologies. Finally, bilateral trade agreements incorporated new IP 
chapters, adding more dimensions to owner protections and justifying further 
domestic law reform.
In all these areas, user freedoms were given short shrift, with users generally 
characterized as “pirates” and seen as wrongly encouraged in their wanton behaviour 
by anarchists -  opportunistic, legally savvy radical technology makers.7 By 
micromanaging Internet usage and creating new and serious obligations affecting 
technology makers and access providers, these initiatives constituted a severe attack 
on the earlier promise of free communications and technological liberation.
Copyright maximalization -  strong owner rights permitting micromanagement 
of others’ engagement with digitized content with a view to profit extraction -  
undermines the lives, self-discoveries and possibilities of engagement with people 
across the globe and within territorial boundaries. Copyright critique has been 
preoccupied with responding to this limited economic vision of digital law reforms, 
seen to undermine the broader potential of the “information society”.
As Pamela Samuelson argues:
new public-regarding politics of intellectual property must have a positive 
agenda of its own. It cannot just oppose whatever legislative initiatives 
the major content industry organizations support (although it almost 
certainly will need to do this as well). It should be grounded on the 
realization that information is not only or mainly a commodity; it is also a 
critically important resource and input to learning, culture, competition, 
innovation, and democratic discourse. Intellectual property must find a 
home in a broader-based information policy, and be a servant, not a 
master, of the information society.8
In 2001, the Conference on the Public Domain heralded the beginning of 
international IP academic activism around these issues.9 Since that time, the 
attention of many researchers has focused on formulating a more positive public
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ambition for this body of law.10 This global copyright commentary has come to link 
analyses of the role of copyright with conjecture about the future democratic 
possibilities of the Internet and society. Copyright is often written about as if it is, or 
could be, a kind of constitutional law for the Internet. Were copyright to 
appropriately balance the private rights of owners to control access to information 
against the public interest of creators, consumers, and the public-at-large to gain 
access, then the foundations for a democratic Internet and society (at least in regard 
to the so-called western liberal democracies) would be more secure.
This commentary explores the notion of copyright law as the new constitutional 
law of cyberspace. The case for a public-minded copyright law is explored 
historically and in realpolitik terms, but the conclusion is that the chance for 
copyright playing a constructive formal regulatory role across the globe is 
exceedingly weak.
Is Copyright the Same Across the Globe?
Historically, there have been differences in the rights recognized by states, reflecting 
different cultural and legal responses to technological innovation. Whilst ostensibly 
similar in character, exclusive rights were conferred to some depending upon the 
classification of copyright subject-matter, which is another way of saying that the 
rights were, to varying degrees, technologically and culturally specific.11 Even 
amongst western nations with similar economies, different national emphases were 
accommodated; the French celebration of photography, cinematography, and its 
comparatively generous film rights are an example.12 However, in the 1990s, piracy 
was identified as a generic problem affecting all “digital technology”. Piracy 
mandated essentially the same legal response to “digitization”, regardless of the 
nature of the technology, the uses made of it, the domestic history, and local 
circumstance.
Accordingly, significant differences in the history and development of rights 
and treatment -  between northern and southern countries, western and Asian legal 
systems, Commonwealth and continental regimes in particular -  were set aside, so
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that trade opportunities of the “digital economy” could be expanded for all. The 
“one size” we were all moving towards was primarily an American standard, 
reflecting that country’s strength in the information economy and its comparative 
influence in world trade relations.13 This trend was further accentuated in bilateral 
and multilateral free trade agreements, notwithstanding the regional and national 
anomalies that also crept in with these negotiations.14 Consequently, owner 
protections have advanced everywhere and digital freedoms have been formally and 
symbolically curtailed.
American critics of these developments all too frequently refer to the USA 
Constitution for inspiration: “The Congress shall have the power...to promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited time to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”15 They 
argue that the public policy objectives of copyright have been discounted in the 
current climate, and, whilst it is hard for civil society interests to be heard in global 
trade forums, domestic challenges to such laws may be possible. Several 
constitutional challenges to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ÇDMCA) 1998 
have been fought, with leading academics supporting amicus briefs.16
Though no body blow to the reforms has been dealt, the prevailing view 
remains that this has to do with the “conservative capture” of the legislature and 
judiciary. Few cast much doubt on the political potential of American copyright law; 
the presumption remains that copyright law can be “saved” and returned to its proper 
public path or allowed to reach its full potential in the USA, and then, perhaps, 
across the globe.
Similar concerns with the privatization agenda of global copyright have been 
noted in Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada. However, there 
has been very limited constitutional argument in these jurisdictions.
Outside of the USA, the case for a “public-political” agenda for copyright is far 
weaker. Historically, Anglo common law speaks more to incoherent and multiple
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justifications for copyright than to a global basis for public-minded copyright.17 
Commonwealth constitutional provisions on intellectual property, where they exist, 
are generally very sparse.
Twentieth century Australian law is dishearteningly weak in its formal 
recognition of public interests. The public character of copyright finds little clear 
legal expression, though it does exist. To describe the communicative freedoms 
copyright entails, one needs to draw attention to the indistinct possibilities that lie 
beyond the clearer definition of the exclusive rights of owners, and refer to a myriad 
of precise but conditional “exceptions to infringement”. These entitlements are 
conferred on special interests or circumstances rather than applying to citizens at 
large. Thus, to speak for the public, one has to speak of silences and gaps in the law 
located across various sections of an unwieldy body of legislation that enable access. 
In Australian copyright, the public interest is only partially formulated. At best, it is 
expressed as a negative or as residual. It comes to light by reference to the positivity 
of the owner’s defined interests. As legislation, the constitution, and common law 
provide no broad basis of conceptualization of public rights, there is little legal fabric 
that can be seized with fervour -  clearly, emphatically, and without qualification.
What Does This Mean?
The strategy of defending the democratic Internet by relying on a global copyright, 
free speech and innovation tradition is politically and jurisprudentially naïve. In 
reality, there is not much legal foundation for this “tradition” to build upon outside of 
the United States. Further, the tenor of the global diplomatic discourse initiated by 
the USA makes the task much harder for countries to accomplish than has previously 
been given credit. To the extent that a public-minded copyright law depends on the 
power of “independent” nation states to constitute the associated Internet freedom, 
USA trade and legal practice in treaty negotiations is so unsupportive of these 
politics that it stifles any emergence of pro-public copyright traditions in other 
jurisdictions, even though academic discourse may popularize a desire for it.
This is not to say that USA maximalization speaks and all obey. Domestic 
resistance to copyright maximalization continues, but without effective engagement. 
Whereas in the USA maximalist and free speech agendas for copyright are perceived 
as distinct and separate strands, in Australian debates these distinctions are 
overwhelmed by an ill-focused and undefined “anti-American” jurisprudence. It is 
the undemocratic nature of global copyright negotiations that unleashes this passion. 
For example, Australia’s signing to USA-style DMCA-plus owner rights in the 
Australia-USA Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (2005) led to legislative consideration 
of USA-style fair use rights, the purpose being to rejig the domestic copyright 
balance in line with the USA and to demonstrate Australian government
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responsiveness to local political discontent.18 Enacting fair use rights would have 
led to a clearer domestic articulation of citizen entitlement to access copyrighted 
works than currently exists. The Federal Attorney General invited submissions on 
the merit of such a reform.19 In analyzing the benefits or otherwise of this “alien” 
approach, Australian legal discourse became preoccupied with critiquing the 
limitations and problems of American fair use jurisprudence.20 These critiques were 
not just from owner lobbies (the local chapters for multi-national media owners); it 
also came from frustrated “activist” academics. It is highly ironic that the case for a 
democratic Internet and free communications was so readily able to be diverted and 
politically dissipated through the practices o f local democracy in the form of 
domestic consultations about the substance of proposed law reforms.
There had been little space for the assertion of Australian legal identity and IP 
best interest during the FTA negotiations, where the Australian government 
preoccupation was with other economic interests. When finally given a restricted 
and belated invitation to get involved in formulating an IP policy, Australian lawyers 
and academics seized the opportunity to assert local autonomy. They articulated the 
superiority of our domestic IP wisdom and, correspondingly, the benefits of their 
own legal training and experience. The consequence was a near wholesale rejection 
of “American style fair use”. What we saved was the Australian legal tradition of 
fair dealing rights.21 All this means is that the law remains complex, piecemeal, 
limited, fragmented and without clear identification or development of Australian 
copyright’s “public” side.
Resisting the Americanization of our jurisprudence stems from a strong belief 
in due process, legal accountability, and the entitlement of citizens (and lawyers) in a 
liberal democracy to determine their best interests. However, the space for such 
assertion of power and local common sense during the negotiations was, in reality, 
very limited. The USA government, with the complicity of the Australian Federal 
government, set the main terms of the political and legal discourse about copyright 
reform in Australia. The domestic response effectively contained and neutralized the
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agd/WWW/MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Page/Media_Releases_2006_Second_Quarter_14_May_2006_ 
-_Major_Copyright_Reforms_Strike_Balace_-_0882006 >.
local resistance to global owner agendas. In this instance, democratic process was a 
local diversion and a face-saving exercise. The fair use inquiry allowed for a small 
venting of opinion, which gave a symbolic nod towards the “democratic” health of 
our legal processes. Arguably, the related and more recent technological protection 
measure (TPM) inquiry does the same.22 Such processes diffuse local discontent 
over USA hegemony and legal control, and give the appearance of real domestic 
political engagement. They exhaust our energies and attention. But all that is on the 
table is minor tinkering within a woefully inadequate legal framework, where the 
associated reforms only increase the complexity and impenetrability of the rights 
ostensibly available to citizens.
Based upon the recent Australian experience, I think it is naïve to entertain the 
idea that there is potential in constitutional law and in copyright legislation for 
delivering a more publicly-minded copyright. Whatever possible successes it may 
have in the USA, publicly-minded copyright cannot be relied upon as a global force 
capable of confronting copyright maximalist agendas for information capitalism. 
The belief that it is capable of doing so is rooted in modem political rhetoric about 
the sovereignty of independent nation states and democratic engagement, mistaking 
those ideals for contemporary political reality. The undemocratic politics and legal 
processes of globalization, which favour copyright maximalization, cannot be 
effectively combated in the “democratic” spaces provided within nation states.
A More Positive Role for Civil Society
A more fruitful avenue is to look beyond nation states to global regulation using 
private technological law -  that is, to look to the role of copyright as understood and 
practiced in civil society and especially in technical communities.23 As has been 
commentated on, copyright licensing practices, in particular free software and open 
source licensing, can play a very productive role in enabling fuller citizen 
participation and collective engagement. Yochai Benkler puts it this way:
To the extent one values active, engaged individual participation in 
defining and expressing political values in a polity as central to the 
democratic enterprise, one should strengthen peer-based models of 
information production and exchange, even if this requires policies that 
weaken proprietary production based on a sale of goods model.
22 See Michael Geist, “Australia A.G. Releases Draft TPM Legislation”, online: Michael Geist -  
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23 See supra note 7.
[T]here is an area of overlap between the concerns of democracy -  at least 
a wide range of liberal versions of democracy -  and those of autonomy. A 
widely dispersed system of information production, which produces a 
wide range of diverse information about and representations of how life 
can be, serves autonomy in the first dimension just as it serves robust 
democratic discourse.24
Benkler’s work is primarily concerned with the provision of an open 
communications infrastructure with low technical and financial barriers to entry for 
programmers and support for the tailoring of technology to suit local circumstances 
and needs. What remains unclear is why the cause for a democratic Internet should 
extend from supporting free and open computer programming to a constitutional case 
for peer-based production and distribution of all copyrighted content. Does a public- 
minded copyright require a commitment to facilitating open access to content of all 
kinds?
To presume that it does suggests that the enabling politics secured by free and 
open software is the same as that for open cultural content. That is, my need for 
access to open source Apache (the most commonly sourced web server) is essentially 
the same as my need for free MP3 downloads. To me, it should go without saying 
that the need to access a web server is far greater. This computer programming 
founds the communicative possibilities of the network. I cannot engage with others 
over the Internet without such tools. Thus, politically speaking, it is a far more 
important technology. Access to my favourite MP3s may improve my mood and 
sense of wellness. Sharing files might help build my friendly relationship with 
others (or not). Ripping files, which I use creatively, can build culture and lead to 
new innovations.25 However, a judgement about the public good of sharing 
necessitates a decision about the motivations and merits of the uses made. Having 
access to more, and having more made accessible to me, is not necessarily better for 
society.
Questions of cultural identity and cultural autonomy are not just about having 
access to communications, but also about having control. For example, from an 
indigenous point of view, where there is a history of exploitation and denial of 
cultural and political rights, the presumption of the invaders’ sense of entitlement to 
access and appropriate indigenous land, culture and lore, is a problem still to be 
redressed, at least in Australia. Pushing for more access only papers over the 
political problems of the political constitution of our settler societies.26
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product of a history of Empire -  [2006] AIPLRes 13 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/ 
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Whether copyright helps or hinders a democratic Internet cannot be decided by 
idealized assertions of the inherent public good of open access. For copyright to 
serve a public law function, it needs to be responsive to real communities and their 
political problems. Here, the public is not all of one kind or in the same situation. 
Being responsive to historical impediments to communities coming together -  
problems of being respected, heard, and able to realise common desires -  is a higher 
priority for a democratic Internet than a commitment to open copyright or enabling 
individual autonomy per se. This requires looking beyond questions about the 
politics of copyright law and the Internet, and looking at copyright in relation to the 
broader state of society and the problems facing disadvantaged groups.
There should be serious doubts about the potential for copyright to play any 
generalized “public good” role. In formal legal terms, the constitutions and current 
democratic processes of nation states are inadequate to advance this end. In global 
private law terms, there remains tremendous potential for serving democratic and 
political ends within technical and scientific contexts; however, a more complicated 
set of questions about the good of access arises beyond these contexts. Good 
individual and institutional strategic copyright decision making about licensing and 
access can still be used to empower individuals and communities in ways that do 
make a difference. But whether a democratic good is served by access to 
knowledge, culture and innovation depends very much on the context and use of the 
rights.
